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Financial Reform in Korea: 
Unfinished Agenda 
Jae-Jung Kwon* 
Since the financial crisis in 1!397, Korea has achieved many 
positive changes, ranging from stronger balance sheets of 
financial institutions to significant efficiency gains at the 
opera~rional level. Despite the marked changes, however, much 
work still remains ahead for Korea's linancial system. This 
paper reflects upon what has transpired since the containment 
of the crisis and further discusses emerging issues. Prudence in 
lending policy exercised by financial institutions should be 
further improved. Although they ;:ire not likely to develop into a 
systemic risk, corrective actions niust be taken on structural 
problems such as  excessive debts carried by households and 
small and medium-sized enterpri.ses. Flow of funds should be 
normalized by revitalizing long-term capital market. 
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I. Overview 
As in other East Asian countries, the immediate causes of the: 
Korean financial crisis in late 19!I)7 were the sudden outflows of 
short-term capital and a weak economic system. Thanks to the 
foreign debt rescheduling and many swift. reform efforts. however, 
Korea pulled through the worst phase of the crisis. Ever since, it:; 
extel-nal position has enormous1,y improvt:d and now remains 
strong. Meanwhile, by mobilizing large-scale public funds, the 
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Korean Government cleaned up the balance sheets of financial 
institutions, the majority of which were commercial banks. 
Fortunately, the Korean economy made its rebound earlier and 
stronger than many expected. By mid 1999, however, Daewoo, the 
then second largest business conglomerate, fell out. The culmi- 
nation of this event was followed by a volatile financial market 
although the corporate sector outperformed expectations. By late 
2000, the Government injected additional public funds into the 
financial sector, which initiated the second round of the financial 
sector restructuring. 
To the many's surprise. Korea's financial sector has undergone 
drastic changes. Although it is often globally regarded exceptionally 
successful, financial reform in Korea is yet distant from its 
completion. Neither do the problems of S K  Global in 2003 prove 
that restructuring in Korea is being rolled back. Rather, it would 
be fair to say that the Korean reform is now faced with more, if 
not greater, challenges, which will determine the sustainability of 
the corporate sector profitability, and thereby the long-term 
economic growth. 
The purposes of this study are to examine Korea's experiences 
throughout its financial reform and discuss current, and emerging. 
major issues of its financial system. The background of the 1997 
financial crisis, including its nature and financial reform measures, 
is provided in Section 11. The main changes thereafter in the 
financial system are considered in Section 111. Whereas issues 
critical for the system are identified to discuss their implications in 
Section N, and the remaining tasks for the financial sector are 
discussed in Section V. 
11. Background of the 1997 Financial Crisis 
A. Nature of the Crisis 
The more imminent cause of the crisis than the sudden oufflows 
of short-term capital was the near depletion of the foreign currency 
reserve. The latent structure of the crisis owes to more funda- 
mental factors, however. In fact, the origin of the crisis in the 
domestic context may be found in the long-standing structural 
weaknesses of the Korean economy, while the exogenous effects 
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from the Southeast Asian crisis arc:: worthy 1.0 recognize. 
Korea was ill prepared for the challenges in the global econornitr: 
environment, while falling behind the rapid pace of the globalization 
process. For instance, its excessive exposure to the short-term 
external d.ebts made it particularly vulnerable 1.0 cyclical shocks a'; 
well as  changes in market expectations. Even worse. Korea's 
economy has long been plagued by the pervasive moral hazard 
problems, as  a part of which financial institutions indulged ill 
questionable lending practices. For. every reckless lender, there waij 
also a reckless borrower, nonetheless. 
Chaebols, or family owned cong~lomerates, pursued highly lever- 
aged business expansion, playing their fate with the so-called 
"too--big-to-fail'' myth. Consequentl.,y, the corporate sector suffered 
from healy debts and substantial losses in investment. Naturally, 
this progress culminated in the staggering accumulation of 
non-performing loans in the financial sector and the erosion of 
capital base in financial institutions. 
Most notably, however, a string of large corporate insolvenciej 
and the consequent hail of bad loans hacl threatened the health of 
the financial system. Chaebol bankruptcies starting with Hanbo, 
Sammi. Jinro, Haitai and Kia Groups began in early 1997. On': 
immediate impact was the steep loss of the investors' confidence. 
Consequently, between September and November 1997. abrupt 
outflows of the short term foreign portfolio investments triggered 
the massive capital flight and currency tumble. For instance, 
Korean won had plunged by 27.5 percent against the U.S. dollar in 
November 1997 and lost 40.3 percent of its value from thl? 
preceding year in December 1997. 
In essence, Korea's crisis was riot caused only from within the 
banking sector, but was far more complicated by inherent problems 
in the overall economic structure, which the Government tooli 
initiatives to reform. Overcoming the crisis, therefore, was a natura.1 
consequence of resolving excess production in the corporate sector 
and normalizing the financial sector with a view to accomplish the 
efficient allocation of financial resources available. 
B. Crisis Management 
In late 1997, the Korean Government's urgent task was to resolve 
the foreign liquidity crisis with large support from the intcrnationzl 
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community, including the IMF's provision of the Supplemental 
Reserve Facilities, successful negotiations for the short term debt 
maturity extension in March 1998, and the issuance of USD 4 
billion of sovereign bonds in April 1998. 
By relying on the IMF's prescriptions in the early stage of the 
crisis, the Korean Government restrained expenditure to allow high 
interest rates and the Korean won to depreciate. The focus of the 
prescriptions was restraining the corporate investment demand. 
which controlled the current balance and retained foreign liquidity. 
Facing the imminency of system collapse, furthermore, such 
programs as blanket deposit insurance, foreign debt guarantees, 
and relief loans were introduced to recover confidence in the 
market. 
Because the crisis was rooted in the structural weaknesses of the 
economy, government policies were not only limited to easing the 
foreign liquidity crunch, but also were multi directional to address 
the weaknesses properly. As the financial sector restructuring 
followed. insolvent financial institutions were reorganized through 
purchase and assumption (P&A) transactions or mergers in view of 
their bad assets. Public funds were injected to resolve the non- 
performing loans and increase the capital of financial institutions. 
Following the first round of the financial sector restructuring in 
September 1998, the Government launched a full-blown economic 
recovery measure through stimulation. For instance, the flexible 
money supply and interest rate cuts were carried out to boost the 
domestic demand, ease the credit crunch, and prevent further 
erosion of the industrial base. 
Due to the prompt government actions, together with the 
repletion of foreign reserve under a favorable external environment, 
the economy made its rebound earlier and stronger than generally 
expected. In fact, the recovery process in Korea has followed the 
classic "V-shape" until recently. The economy recovered at an 
increasing pace after hitting the floor in the third quarter of 1998. 
During the next two consecutive years in 1999 and 2000, Korea 
has enjoyed a solid growth. 
a) Priority of the Government Policy 
In the early stage of the restructuring, there was a much heated 
debate over the sequence of restructuring. It was argued by some 
that the financial sector restructuring had to precede because 
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restructuring the corporate sector could only be effective when 
carried out through healthy financial institutions. However, the 
health of financial institutions anl:l the profitability of corporations 
are the tvvo sides of the same coin. In other words, the former can 
be accom,plished only if the latter is accomplished, and vice versa. 
Consequently, Korea simultaneously pursued financial and corpo- 
rate sector restructuring. In more real terms, restructuring the 
financial sector and financially weak corporations had to be 
accomplished through the lead participation of their main creditor 
banks. The origin of this scheme may be found in the so-called 
London Approach, once employed 1.1y the llnited Kingdom. 
b) Financial Sector Restructuring, 
(1) First Round 
The first round of the financial restructuring focused on easin;? 
the capital crunch in the corporate sector and restoring thl: 
functional system in response to the economic crisis since the enti 
of 1997. Upon facing the danger of systemic collapse, the Korean 
Government had to mobilize a large amount of public funds to first 
stabilize and then to rehabilitate the system. Rather than con- 
cealing the problems, the Governrrlent realistically recognized 10sse:j 
from the loans extended to the corporate sector with assistance:j 
from the IMF, World Bank and international accounting firms. 
In April 1998, the Government established the financial restruc- 
turing plan with the aim to stabilize the financial system and 
improve soundness and efficiency of the financial institutions. On'? 
of the main pillars of financial rr:;t.ructuring was to support viable 
financial institutions by cleaning up their bad loans and recap- 
italization. Another goal was to ed.t non-vial:~lr: financial institution:; 
from the market as  soon as  possible. Resolving insolvent financial 
institutions was the main target of the restructuring during th i ' j  
period. 
Under the restructuring framework, internationally recognizeti 
accountinj; firms were commissioned to perform diagnostic review:; 
on financial institutions to evaluate their viability. Based on the 
reviews, n.on-viable financial instit1.1tions were liquidated and viablf- 
ones were provided with support to undergo a prompt normalization 
process. Consequently, the Government shut  down five commercial 
banks, whose assets were subsequently transferred to other healthy 
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ones. After the initial stage of the reform, financial institutions 
made self-rescue efforts to regain their soundness and strengthen 
their businesses. For instance, they sought to merge with other 
banks, attracted foreign capital, downsized manpower, and issued 
new stocks to increase their equity capital. 
For normalizing the system, the Government's aggregate fiscal 
support has been around KRW 109.6 trillion won, or about USD 87 
billion. Approved by the Korean National Assembly in 1998, most of 
these funds came through bond issuances by two entities-the 
Korea Asset Management Corporation, or KAMCO, and the Korea 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, or KDIC. Of the total of KRW 64 
trillion, which was mobilized in May, 1998, KRW 20.5 trillion was 
expended by KAMCO to purchase non-performing loans (NPLs), and 
KRW 43.5 trillion by KDIC for recapitalization and guaranteed 
deposit repayments. KAMCO recycled KRW 18.4 trillion of its assets 
in 1999 and 2000 combined. Aside from that, other resources, as  
much as KRW 27 trillion, were procured and used by issuing 
government bonds and selling state-owned shares. 
Korea's progress has been quite dramatic in view of the changes 
made with the financial institutions. With the injection of public 
funds. a substantial amount of bank assets have now been 
managed by nationalized banks. While the worst performing five 
banks were liquidated. the Government demonstrated its commit- 
ment to opening the market to foreigners for market participation 
through the sale of Korea First Bank to the American Newbridge 
Capital in 1999.1 
Throughout the entire restructuring process, the principle 
underlying the Government's support has  been the pledge of 
self-rescue efforts by the financial institutions themselves. This 
pledge bound financial institutions to make their utmost efforts on 
loss sharing and downsizing, the implementation of which has  been 
closely monitored by the Financial Supervisory Commission, or the 
FSC. The banks' cost saving efforts can be affirmed by the industry 
wide 35.6 percent reduction in the number of employees during a 
single year after the crisis. and the closure of 1,200 branch offices. 
As a result, bank assets per employee have sharply increased by 
almost 50 percent over the subsequent three years. 
' ~ o r a r n  Bank and Korea Exchange Bank were also sold later to Citigroup 
and Lone Star Fund, respectively. 
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The FSC provided a similar tre;:ltment a s  to the restructuring of 
non-bank financial institutions. Insolvent merchant banks were 
closed and incorporated into Hanareum Merchant Bank. ;I bridge 
merchant bank. Self-rehabilitation measures under the initiative of 
major shareholders have been im~plemented, with the FSC closely 
monitoring the progress. The institutions whose self-rehabilitation 
measures proved inadequate were subject to either corrective 
actions or closure. 
(2) Second Round 
Throughout 1998, the Govern1:nent focused on balance sheet 
restructuring, such as  the disposal of bad loans and recapital- 
ization. From the end of 1998, its focus seemed to be shiftezl 
toward iinproving elements at  the operational level, such a s  
corporate governance and credit risk management. When Daewoo 
fell out in 1999. however. Korezt's financial system was hit hard 
once again. Fund flows had been seriously skewed, as  the liquidity 
within the capital markets dried up anci a significant. amount o f  
cash was withdrawn from the investment trust companies. Sucn 
funti flow,s in turn imperiled corporations that had come to depend 
on the issuance of debentures. 
Private market participants were not capable of resolving these 
problenls. which made the funcling of additional public money 
inevitable. Additionally, asset classification standards were strictly 
applied against the banks' bad assets, resulting in the need fc'r 
more infusion of public funds. In order to raise KRW 40 trillion of 
additional funds. the Korean Government obtained approval frorn 
the Natio~nal Assembly in December 2000, when the second round 
of the financial sector restructurin,q was launched. The funds raised 
were useti to, first, recapitalize ailing banks to improve their BIS 
ratios; sh.ore up capital of Seoul Guaranty Corporation to honcr 
guarantees for Daewoo Group and non-Daewoo workout companies; 
and inject capital to meet any shortfall for the additional sales of 
non-performing loans. 
Launched in September 2000. I-he goals of the second round of' 
the restructuring included establishing a government assisted bank 
holding company and improving global competitiveness. It is 
noteworthy that in the second round, the Government not only 
cleaned up the banks' balance sheets, but also successfully acconl- 
plished bank consolidation. Poteriiiially ur1dc:rcapitalized banks, i.e.. 
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Chohung Bank, Hanvit Bank, KEB, and Seoul Bank, presented 
their rehabilitation plans to the authorities. These plans were 
scrutinized by the Bank Management Evaluation Committee. 
The banks deemed to be viable, such as Korea Exchange Bank 
and Chohung Bank, were allowed to implement their own normal- 
ization plans. Other severely undercapitalized banks, including 
Hanvit Bank, Peace Bank, Kwangju Bank, and Kyungnam Bank, 
however, Were recapitalized with public funds and placed under the 
control of a financial holding company as subsidiaries. As a result, 
Woori Financial Holding Company was established in March 2001. 
Also, the second and third largest banks. Kookrnin Bank and 
Housing and Commercial Bank, merged in 2001 to create the new 
Kookmin Bank. the nation's largest bank. 
C) Corporate Sector Restructuring 
Along with the financial sector restructuring, the restructuring of 
corporate borrowers' balance sheets proceeded. Basically, major 
creditor institutions have taken the leading role in implementing 
corporate restructuring policies. They have undertaken fair loss 
sharing practices by requiring corporations to bear restructuring 
costs. Meanwhile, the Government's role has  only been limited to 
providing guidelines for a well-functioning mechanism. 
Initially developed by the Government were the five tasks to 
foster the corporate restructuring process: (1) enhance the trans- 
parency of corporate governance, (2) overhaul cross debt guarantees 
and unfair transactions by and among Chaebol affiliates, (3) 
improve business capital structures, [4) encourage businesses to 
focus on core competencies, and (5) strengthen the accountability of 
major shareholders and top management. 
In retrospect, the so called "workout scheme" may be said to 
have been a mechanism most significant in connection with the 
corporate sector. In view of the corporate bankruptcies following 
one after another, and creditor institutions seeking to collect debts 
beyond need, the Government helped creditors to reach cooperative 
agreements. While injecting public funds into financial institutions 
to resolve non performing loans and improve their capital base, the 
Government had provided an effective basis for them to maximize 
on recovering loans of the greatest default potential under a 
cooperative framework, and for them to take actions for enhancing 
financial structures of the ailing Chaebols. 
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In early 1998, the FSC developtsd basic principles and operating 
procedures of the workouts, by drawing the benefits from the 
British example of the early l.!E)90s, further requiring creditor 
institutions to classify the top 64 r:orporat.es into "normal," "viable," 
and "non viable." In June 1998. most financial institution:j 
including all banks entered into the Corporate Restructuring 
Agreement., thereby initiating efforts to improve the problematil- 
corporates' capital structures. This Agreement had played an 
important role providing guidelines on workouts prior to the 
Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act entering into effect in 2001. 
ResultinLg from the creditors' coll.ective efforts included the fate of 
55 businesses decided in 1998, 22 businesses including 12 Daewoo 
affiliates in 1999, and 6 in 2000, amounting to as  much a s  K F W T  
104 trillion of corporate debts, with their capital  structure:^ 
improved. Not that any legal procedures did not exist, but because 
the number of insolvent businesses and their liabilities outweigheti 
the courts' capacity, workout scheme based upon the creditors' 
voluntary, mutual consultations and decisions proved more prag- 
matic and effective.2 
In addition to restructuring their balance sheets, corporation:; 
have been encouraged to establish and focus on strengthening their 
core com;petencies by resolving their overcapacity problems anti 
selling non-core assets and affiliates. Consolidated financial state- 
ments in compliance with international accounting standards began 
to phase in starting last year. To build transparent management 
systems, dogmatic owner-management has been checked internally 
and extennally. Rights and responsibilities of outside directors wer'e 
enhanced while the requirements of cumulative voting were eased. 
In addition, class action lawsuits will be gradually introduced.. 
Finally, businessmen and accountants committing accountin,g 
frauds or who are found responsible for the insolvency of their 
companies may face criminal prosecution. With these and other 
developments, we can reasonably come to a conclusion that the 
restructuring efforts made to da.te by the corporate sector are 
commendable. 
d) Regulatory Reform 
In the past, the financial stxtor was utilized as  a policy 
' see  Kin1 (2002) on the analysis of ~rrorkout outcome. 
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instrument to reinforce the real economy. For instance, direct 
allocation of capital, manipulation of monetary policy, and 
regulation of business prevailed. Due to the Financial Liberalization 
and Globalization in the 1980s. direct regulations toward the 
financial institutions were somewhat relaxed. In the 1990s, the 
authorities sought to implement deregulatory measures. However, 
the authorities failed to implement deregulatory measures due to 
various circumstances. 
While many regulatory burdens were lifted to stimulate compe- 
tition in the market and to .guarantee the autonomy of financial 
institutions, other standards of soundness and transparency were 
further strengthened. 
From a supervisory standpoint, a more significant change than 
others would be valuating the assets of financial institutions on a 
realistic basis and recognizing the resulting losses. For instance, 
loan classification and provisioning standards have been strength- 
ened, while securities are marked to market. Furthermore, forward 
looking criteria reviewing debtor's servicing capability in addition to 
the past transaction history were adopted since June 2000. 
Securities held by financial institutions were pragmatically valuated, 
and a significant portion of the risks resulting from the securities 
held by investment trust companies were relayed to investors, 
thereby effectively securing the financial system against changes 
arising from within the securities market. Particularly, by improving 
a system in connection with the money market funds (MMFs) that 
once risked the system a s  in the SK Global and credit card crises 
in 2003, each individual risk has been diffused before they 
combined would risk the entire system. 
111. Major Changes After the Crisis 
Since the initial focus of the financial reform in Korea was placed 
on restructuring of balance sheets of banks, major changes are 
easily found in that area. Another integral part of the reform is the 
rebirth of financial institutions as  genuinely profit pursuing entities, 
free from any government intervention and the burden of having to 
support real economic sectors. 
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A. Improvement in Asset Quality and Profitability 
The success of the financial reform is easily found in the 
improved asset quality, profitability, and productivity of the 
financial sector as a whole. 
First, a significant amount of the bad assets accumulated within 
the financial industry were promptly resolved. As Figure 1 
illustrates, the combined and continuing efforts by the Governme~~t 
and the financial sector made this result possible. Although the 
loans classified as substandard and below by the Government as  of 
June 1998 amounted to KRW 136 trillion, they were reduced to 
KRW 32 trillion as  of June 2004. The largest cause of such a 
significant reduction was the Government's large scale purchase of 
non performing loans via the Korea Asset Management Corporation, 
or KAMCO. Consequently. resolution of the NPLs helped to stabilize 
the financial system and contribute towards a sustainable growth of 
the real economy. 
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FIGURE 2 
NPL RATIO AND CAPITAL DEQUACY OF COMMERCIAL BANKS 
In conjunction with the NPL resolution, furthermore, efforts were 
made by financial institutions to enhance their capital base. 
Immediately following the financial crisis, their profitability and 
earnings capability were further enhanced by the Government's 
recapitalization initiatives via KAMCO. As far as commercial banks 
are concerned, their average BIS improved to 10.45% by 2003. a 
big jump from end-1997 when many banks' capital was technically 
wiped out. 
With asset quality improved, financial institutions' profitability 
has been enhanced. Figure 3 illustrates changes in the commercial 
banks' profitability before and after the financial crisis. The banks' 
profitability assessed by ROA and ROE rebounded since 1998 after 
hitting the lowest point. Between 2002 and 2003. their profitability 
had been challenged by the deterioration of their asset quality, 
especially in the household sector; however, improvements have 
been seen since early 2004. Whether it may overcome the 1% 
hurdle, and whether it could demonstrate the sustainability desired 
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after overcoming that hurdle, has become an issue of significance; 
nonetheless, it is not feasible to deny that it will continue to 
improve. Taking pre-provisioning profits into account, the consis- 
tently improving trends are identifiable. 
B. Enhanced Efliciency 
Provided that public funds were injected, requiring downsizing of 
the branch network and manpower, financial institutions have 
significantly improved productivity and cost efficiency as a result. 
The banks' entrenched management behaviors and increased 
producttvlty are easily identifiable through the efficiency ratio., 
Figure 4 illustrates steep declining of the operating income during 
1998; however. the emciency ratio since 1999 has declined. In i t  
way, 45.9 percent of the ratio speaks for how the Korean bank*$ 
are competitive even against the banks in the U.S., the U.K., and 
other advanced economies. One caveat admitted, however, is the 
difficulty entailed in directly comparing the Korean banks to t h ~  
others, given that the latter invest more heavily in the information 
technology. Moreover, that the efficiency ratio in 2001 was 41.5 
3 Efficiency ratio is operating expenses divided by the sum of net interest 
income and non interest income. 
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Source: Financial Supervisory Service. 
percent implies that there is not much room to improve efficiency 
within the Korean banks. 
It is clear, however, that the Korean banks have improved 
efficiency following the crisis. What is apparent has been further 
looked into by breaking down the efiiciency ratio into the return on 
asset and the cost to asset ratio, because focusing upon any of the 
cost a s  the numerator and the income as the denominator would 
yield improvement. Figure 5 illustrates the cost to income ratio by 
looking at income/assets on the vertical axis and cost/assets on 
the horizontal axis. The dots represent the years over the period. 
Due to the costs reduced and enhanced operating income, trends 
after the crisis are distinguished from those before the crisis. 
In the course of the reform in both the corporate and financial 
sectors. accountability has been seated into management perfor- 
mance. Roles articulated and assigned among the board of directors 
and management, and management improvement agreements 
reached for assessing the performance of the management leading 
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improvements were achieved. It is noteworthy, in particular, that 
Korean banks have developed such governance structure as to meet 
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 
(Cost /Asset ) 
global standards by comprising board of directors with outside 
directors and instituting audit committees within. Performance 
based culture has also made its way into the business environment 
since the late 1990s with the entrles made by foreign financi~d 
institutions into the Korean market, followed by the increasingly 
vitalized participation of foreign specialists in bank management. 
Moreover, as  the significance of the risks and profitability has 
continuously been emphasized from the management perspectivv, 
internal control underpinned by performance indices emerged as  a 
priority. With the guidelines on best practices developed on risk 
management as  per each financial sub sector, the participants have 
been able to pursue innovations of their own. There are numerous 
developments under way, such as  improving credit evaluauo? 
model, building examiners' council, enhancing loan review system. 
and renovating other such infrastructures as  information technology 
system and manpower. 
418 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
C. Changes in Corporate Sector 
There have been also significant changes on the parts of 
corporate borrowers. A scrutiny of the corporates financial condition 
done by Lee and Kwon (2003) particularly of those listed on the 
Korea Stock Exchange, shows indications of improvement in their 
capital structure. By the standards of their creditor banks. 
however, corporate borrowers' financial stability is yet to be seen. 
While improvement in corporate profitability is mainly attributable 
to low interest rates and reduced debt, operating activity and 
volume expansion remain restricted. In this light, it is not easy to 
have full confidence over their profitability at least for the near 
term. 
Moreover, the corporates debt servicing capability has been 
polarized, while the stratum of those with lower profitability and 
debt servicing capability continues to claim a higher proportion. 
According to Lee and Kwon, the listed companies whose EBIT- 
interest coverage is less than 1 peaked in their proportion in 1998 
and demonstrated recovery somewhat thereafter. In the first half of 
2002, by the number of listed companies, it went down to 14.9 
percent and, by the proportion of borrowings, 9.3 percent. On the 
other hand, because the average interest coverage ratio of the 
corporates rated BB, or the lowest rating of those qualified for 
investment grade, is 2.3 in the United States, credit risks yet 
remain high with the corporates. Equally significant were the 
average interest coverage ratio enhanced in the first half of 2002 to 
less than 2.5, and the weight of the corporates in number and 
borrowing size, up to 40 percent. 
The top 25 percent corporate group accomplished an astounding 
level of improvement since the crisis, followed by that of the 
subsequent 25 percent group. Conversely, however, the top 50 to 
75 percent group accomplished a sheer average improvement, 
whereas the lowest 25 percent, minimal in 1999. Eventually, the 
EBIT interest coverage ratio turned negative. Those corporates are 
distinguished from among themselves in terms of the debt servicing 
capability affects the banks' policies on corporate exposure. 
It is also widely known that the corporates' financing demand, 
including internal funding, has significantly declined since the 
financial crisis. Their demand has mostly been covered by utilizing 
what they had internally accumulated, the same which would 
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correspond to subtracting changes in their financial assets from 
changes in their financial liabilities.' According to the Bank of 
Korea's casMow accounts, the shortage of the corporate funding as 
illustrated by Figure 8 since 1980, had reached its apex both in 
absolute and relative economic terms. Its scale and economic 
proportion had rapidly declined and so continued since 1998.4 
There were occasions where the proportion of the corporates' 
funding shortage to the entire economy steeply declined even prior 
to the financial crisis. For instance, in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
this was the case and at which time, the economic growth rate was 
rather greater than the rate of change in the shortage. In the 
aftermath of the crisis, however. the absolute size of the shortage 
4 In absolute terms. the corporates' investment shortages differ from their 
funding shortage. Where the corporates' financing demand and capital 
supply are adjusted via appropriate pricing mechanism, the corporates 
consequently borrow a certain size of funds, the resultive figures of which 
show in the corporates' funding shortages. 
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has significantly been reduced and the economic growth rate 
demonstrated lesser momentum. In other words, the rate of growth 
for the corporates' financing demand by large has declined after the 
crisis and the GDP growth rate returned to an appropriate level. 
thereby implicating possibilities of the Korean economy entering 
into a low growth pattern. 
It is not easy to pin down exactly by how much the  corporate:^' 
financing demand will recover. However, it is deducible that, from 
the rapidly declining investment demand from within the restruc- 
turing process, and the recessions taking place since 2000, the 
corporates' financing demand subsided. Even without taking the 
economic cycle factor into account, nevertheless, it is unlikely that 
the demand will soar a s  in the pre crisis period. Instead, the 
corporates would shift towards pursuing profitability centric marl- 
agement rather than external expansion, and financial institutions 
would undertake stricter reviews of debtors' servicing capabuty and 
their business feasibility. 
Perhaps the most likely factor in deciding what the future 
demand for corporate financing will be, would be the demand for 
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facilities investment. The greater the corporates' investment 
demand, the greater would be their financing demand. Even of 
their investment demand, facilities investment will play to be the 
largest variable. Until recently, corporates have significantly been 
prudent in making facilities investment, as  a consequence of which 
they have rapidly reduced their financing demand. 
There are only a few studies undertaken on whether there were 
structural changes in the Korean businesses' investing patterns. 
Even so, their length of observation is not long and, since the 
economic cycle factor plays a greater part, it is not easy to reach a 
quick conclusion. With these restraints in mind, Song (2002) is 
notable. In this research, he argues that the coporates' investment 
decisions were made based upon profitability and financial stability 
focused upon growth. Reflected by the coporates' increased 
sensitivity towards operating profits, liability ratio, and interest 
coverage ratio, is their recognition of the greater importance for 
profitability, stability, and debt servicing capability than growth 
potential. 
IV. New Frontiers of Reform 
As discussed in the previous sections, much has improved with 
the Korean financial system. Despite these marked changes in the 
financial industry and markets, however, much work still remains 
ahead for Korea's financial service industry and the system as a 
whole to be globally competitive. This section addresses various 
issues, especially ones newly emerging after the containment of the 
1997 crisis. 
A. Prudence in Lending Policy 
Since the financial crisis had primarily resulted from the lending 
institutions' imprudence in their lending policy, the prudence in 
their lending policy would be most important for the sound 
development of the financial industry. The rate of growth in the 
bank loans after the crisis has been modest, as  easily identifiable 
in a simple illustration. Before the crisis, the rate of growth in the 
loans superseded that of GDP; however, it is now the opposite. 
A Granger Causality test was used to ascertain the causal 
relationship between the lending policy and the rate of economic 
FINANCIAL REFORM IN KOREA 
- - Private credit growth . . . . . . . Nominal ~ ~ ' - ; i w t h  ' 1  ~~ - - - -  
Source: Bank of Korea. 
FIGURE 9 
CREDIT EXPANSION AND GDP GROW~H 
growth with more precision. First, from applying the test against 
the period running from 1980 to 1996 prior to the financial crisis. 
we discovered that the rate of growth in private loans caused t h e  
rate of economic growth. We rejected the null hypothesis at a 5 
percent level of significance. but could not do so in the opposite 
direction. During the same period, i t  was apparent that financial 
institutions tended to increase their loans for the economic growth, 
while there were numerous financial policies reflective of the 
Government intents. 
Meanwhile. for the 1997 to 2002 period. the test proved 
conversely, that the economic growth rate caused the rate of gro*., 
in private loans. We were unable to reject the null hypothesis that. 
the rate of growth in private loans a t  a 5 percent level of 
significance does not cause the economic growth rate. Ah in all. 11. 
might be said that in the aftermath of the financial crisis, thr: 
patterns in which the financial sector aiding the growth of real 
economy significantly were reduced, and the financial institutions' 
lending policy became more prudent. 
Some could argue that the post-crisis 'boom and bust' episode 
associated with the credit card business proves the Korean banks' 
inability to properly handle risk management. Although it would be 
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TABLE 1
GRANGER CAUSALITY EST FOR GDP GROW AND CREDIT GROWTH 
Period Null Hypothesis F-statistics @-value) 
GDP Growth ++ Credit Growth 0.29 (0.59) 
1980-1996 GDP Growth e Credit Growth 4.24 (0.04) 
GDP Growth ++ Credit Growth 10.58 (0.01) 
1997-2002 GDP Growth # Credit Growth 3.63 (0.07) 
GDP Growth * Credit Growth 2.74 (0.10) 
1980-2002 GDP Growth # Credit Growth 0.03 (0.87) 
difficult to deny i t  by its entirety, it must be noted that numerous 
systemic changes and improvements have been made to prevent 
recurrence of such problems. The Government, regulators, and 
banks all together have made significant strides since the financial 
crisis to reduce the financial institutions' credit risks and improve 
their corporate governance. 
B. Properties of StabUty 
Following the consideration of the banks' lending policy, it would 
be worthwhile to review the quality of the banks' assets in loans in 
view of the financial system's stability. 
a) Consumer Loans 
Asset qualities of the Korean banks in the aftermath of the crisis 
were aggravated by the corporate loan delinquency. Conversely. they 
were adversely affected by the consumer loan delinquency since 
2002. The largest problem faced was caused by the overly spending 
behavior of the lower income bracket and younger generations. 
Restricted from having financial access in the past, they spent 
beyond their income with credit cards. Assuming the re-aged assets 
are all delinquent, and the ABS divested of are written in the book. 
the amended delinquency ratio would exceed 40 percent. Since the 
newly delinquent are less, the worst phase of the delinquency 
situation would likely be over during the year. Meanwhile, the 
mono-line credit card issuers were helped to stabilize by the 
Government and their creditors. 
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After the consumer loan delinquency spread over to the 
household credit and home equity loans, the banks were hit hard 
as  manifested over the past few years. Given KRW 269.1 trillion of 
the banks' collateralized loans, and KRW 30.2 trillion of the non 
banks' lending assets, including ,those extended by savings banks 
and insurance companies, comprising 21.2% of the total assets 
within the financial industry as  a whole a t  the end of J u n  2004, 
steep depreciation of the real estate property values may signifi- 
cantly affect the asset quality of the entire financial businesse:;. 
According to the Bank of Korea. Korean households as  of 2001 
have in their possession approximately 83% of their assets in 
residential properties, including chonses deposits. In effect, the 
shorter the maturity term, and the earlier the depreciation of real 
estate property values take place. A deluge of available propertie:s 
for sale will result, thereby fueling a far much more aggressive 
'1x1 Korea, most residential property is leased via the chonse systenl. 
which essentially gives the landlord a large deposit of 50-70 percent (of 
property value. The deposit is returned to the tenant upon expiration of the 
lease. 
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lFI0URE 11 
HOUSEHOLD LOANS AND DELINQUENCY 
depreciation of their values and, hence, aggravating the debtors' 
ability to pay back on a faster basis. 
On the other hand, however, rapid appreciation of the real estate 
property values since 2000 has nonetheless been a global 
phenomenon due to low interest rates. With aggressive interest rate 
cuts immediately following the crisis in 1998, it would be difficult 
to assume that it was just a bubble effect of any significance. 
Moreover, given the low interest rates continuing, any rapid 
depreciation of the property values would be unwarranted. The 60 
percent loan to value ratio the banks maintain is relatively 
respectable against those discovered within the advanced economies 
such as  the United States and Europe. It is also unlikely that even 
20% depreciation will have any grave effect upon the asset quality 
of financial businesses. 
What is necessary, however, is extending the term of maturity 
due to the credit crunch potential arising from the concentration of 
short termed secured loans, maturing in 3 years or less. If 
mortgagors roll over their mortgage loans rather than repaying the 
principal, the debtors' debt servicing capabilities need to be 
improved. Although the banks' profitability on consumer loans is 
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within a reach, the level of expo:i;ure non banks have, especiall!~ 
that of mutual savings and credit cooperatives, to the low income 
bracket will continue to affect their asset c~uality and profitability. 
b) SME Loans 
Provided. that the prospecting of the banks' consumer loans has 
validity of its own, if any, future concerns over the Korean banks' 
asset quality would be based up or^. their corporate exposure. Largc: 
corporate exposures have been reduced to 10 percent or less of the 
banks' total exposures. In spite of the rethiction, however, they 
continue to be potentially detrimental aga.in:jt creditor bank, a s  i r ~  
t.he recent S K  Global case. More w1:)rrisome than the large corporate 
exposures are the small and mediu.m sized enterprise (SME) loans. 
Even in 2002 when the fast growth of consumer loans started to 
lose its momentum, the SME loans increased by 22.696, followed by 
17.9% in 2003, thereby comprising 45.4% of the entire loan 
portfolio, equivalent to KRW 235 trillion, within the banking sectoi- 
a s  of end 2003. In view of the continued slowdown of the national 
economy since 2002, sudden oul.growth of the SME loans may 
place a heavy burden upon the asset quality of financial businesses 
in the future. Statistically speaking, the delinquency ratio of the 
SME loans seems to have followed the GDP growth by a 
two-quarter lag. There is a potential that the recession continuing 
since 200:3 may contribute toward increasing the delinquency ratio 
of the SME loans. While the SME loans have increasingly beer1 
extended 'to non-manufacturing businesses for domestic consump- 
1;ion. the continuing severe plight in domestic consumption woulcf 
provide a basis to understand that the SME; loan situation is 1es:i 
propitious than what might be suggested by the bank books. 
Unlike the credit cards, however, approximately 50 percent of the 
SME loans are secured and the b a n  to value ratio remains a t  45 
percent. The loans extended to SMEs, whose cash flows and debt 
servicing capability are uncertain, would burden the banks on an 
incremental basis.6 By the same token, Korean banks will continue 
to play a pivotal role in the corporate restruc;turing in progress. 
(i See the reports on corporate management periodically provided by thl: 
Bank of Korea. 
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FIGURE 12 
SME LOANS AND DELINQUENCY 
Worthy of attention in connection with the restructuring of SMEs 
is the Government's role in providing credit guarantees. The scale 
of the guarantees provided against bankruptcies since the currency 
crisis has continued to grow even after the national economy has 
returned to its normal path. This essentially restricts an effective 
credit risk management in line with market principles, further to 
adversely affecting the restructuring of the SMEs. I t  is also clear 
that ever greening the businesses of least potential for sunival via 
extending loan maturities and guarantees will only be restricting 
competition and will result in greater losses borne by financial 
institutions. 
The provision of the SME related credit guarantees by the two 
government-owned credit guarantee funds.7 grew from KRW 17 
trillion in 1997 to approximately KRW 50 trillion by 2003. It is 
likely that the SMEs of lesser means to service their debts are 
surviving solely by relying upon the renewal of the guarantees by 
their guarantors to extend their loan maturities. For the banks, 
'~orea Credit Guarantee Fund and Korea Technology Credit Guarantee 
Fund. 
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because such guarantees provide loss coverage on the average of 
85 percent for the secured loans, maturity extension will not be a 
problem, so long as  the guarantees are properly obtained. These 
practices, however, result in reduced extension of guarantees and 
aid for start-up businesses. While Korea has a large scale of 
assistance in the form of guarantee for the SMEs, when compared 
with other advanced economies, its guarantees for the venturirg 
businesses are minimal. Thus, it would be desirable for the policy 
funds made available for the SMEs to be reduced in size for the 
SME gua.rantees. Its weight on providirig assistance for start-up 
businesses should also be increasvd. 
C. Short Term Maturities of Assets and Liabilities 
Followi~ng the consummation of the second round of the financial 
sector mstructuring in 2000, the: financial system's overall credit 
risk has declined and its stability enhanced. However, other 
concerns have surfaced, one of ~ ~ h i c h  is market funds taking on 
the short term investment traits, including bank deposits and 
MMFs of one year or less maturity. As illustrated by Figure 13, the 
weight of the short-term deposits of the total liabilities has 
continuecl to grow and, recently, flow of funds has become instable. 
Furthermore, instable flow of funds has resulted in by investors' 
seeking high returns from securities and real estate markets to a 
speculative extent. The greater weight of the short-term deposi-rs 
also translates into an inefficiency of the intermediation a s  a matter 
of function. 
One of the causes may be found in the declining yield rates froin 
the fund:$ supply perspective. Wi'th the continuing economic slow- 
down since 2000, savings and deposit rates, for instance, have 
remained a t  a 5 percent level. resulting in negatives by 2004. In 
this light, funds invested in long-term products were only limited, 
making ithe short-term capital markets more attractive. On the 
other side of the equation, lesser demand in the long-term money 
market a.lso provided a cause. A s  previously discussed, while the 
corporates' investment decisions were out of proportion for their 
ultimate goals targeting expansion only by volume, so to speak, 
their recognition for the significance of healthy balance sheets since 
the crisis resulted in their behavior curbing long term borrowings. 
Furthermore, short-term borrowing has the benefit of lesser interest 
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
- Total Short-term Deposit - Bank Short-term Deposit - - - - Nonbanks Short-term Deposit 
Source: Bank of Korea. 
payment burden than the long term, especially within the low 
interest rate environment, in addition to the ease with which 
funding is more readily available.8 
At least for now, attractiveness of short-term funds would seem 
to continue for some time. provided that the supply and demand 
for bonds and equities simultaneously had declined. It would also 
led to a reasonable conclusion that the declining trend of interest 
rates will continue, together with persisting uncertainties in the 
performance of the economy and policies. 
To be sure, shorter maturities of assets and liabilities held by 
financial institutions may well cause confusion within the financial 
market by distressing stocks and real estates. further to being 
vulnerable against even external shocks of little scale. In the real 
estate market, for instance, false signals triggered by government 
policies may result in confusions, while the stock market would 
become dysfunctional and invite speculative activities a t  best. With 
more than 42% of the market capital owned by foreign investors in 
the Korea Stock Exchange, Korean individual and institutional 
'1t is also noteworthy that the corporates' utilizing short-term instru- 
ments like commercial paper and usance to repay on corporate bonds 
provided part of the cause. 
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investors a-like are already concentrated on short term trading. 
Due to the shorter cycles experienced by the assets and liabilities 
of financial businesses, the liquidity risk within the financial 
system has been growing larger than ever. Meanwhile, market 
participants continue to have an unsatisfactory level of recognition 
for the liquidity risk and, hence, the infrastructures pertaining to 
accounting and credit valuation rc.:rnain far less than the required. 
Ilnfortunately, these risks are yet not reflected in the pricing of t h e  
financial assets. 
Some of the primary examples woulcl include the investors' 
trading patterns, their pricing process, and the credit rating 
agencies' capability to undertake v.aluatior1 on card issuers' debts. 
which were apparent within the process by which credit card 
bubbles were formed. Given the insufficiency of client information. 
credit card issuers should have sf-rengthened its credit risk man- 
agement a.gainst rapid growths in cash advances and unsecured 
credit card loans. I t  is the discipline that they could have 
exercised, but left unexercised to d.ate. For the issuers seeking fast 
expansion of their business without due diligence of their clients' 
credit worthiness, risk premiums c~:)rresponding to the liquidity and 
credit risks should have been required. 
It is also important to understand that the growth of liquidity 
risk and insufficient recognition are not limited to credit card 
issuers or financial companies alone. Notwithstanding far less debt 
ratios attained by the corporates, improvements on their financia:. 
structures and short-term indebtedness are only achieved to a. 
limited extent. Although the average debt ratio of domestic 
companies a s  of the end of 2003 came to 123.4% compared with 
154.8% for U.S. companies, the proportion of short-term debt. 
averaged 5'4.8%. considerably higher than 17.0% for U .S companies 
This appe,ars to be mostly due to the preference for short-term 
capital because of the persistent, gap between short-term ancl 
long-term interest rates and the urlcertainties many companies fact: 
in raising long-term capital in the debt and equity markets because 
of market volatility. 
As with the credit card issuers, the same risk seems not to bc: 
sufficiently reflected in the pricing of financial assets, which in turr! 
significates that confidence in the market is weak and stability ol 
corporate funding is threatened to :signal a greater liquidity risk. 
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TABLE 2
TRENDS IN LEVERAGE AND SHORT-TERM BORROWING OF CORPORATES 
Debt-Equity Dependency Short-Term Liquidity/Short- 
Year on 











Sources: Korea Stock Exchange: and U.S. Department of Commerce. 
In view of the national economy a t  its whereabouts, liquidity risk 
in reaching investment decisions is now a prerequisite for 
consideration. For the corporates intending to act upon aggressive 
financial strategies, their dependency upon short-term funds must 
be reduced via issuing long term corporate bonds, thereby 
enhancing their cushion against liquidity risks. Even from the 
investors' viewpoint. enhancements would need to be made on their 
recognition and management of the information disclosed on short 
term money markets. 
D. Growing Dependence upon Banking Industry 
A corollary issue following the findings in the previous section is 
that its growing dependence upon the banks is more readily 
identifiable from a larger perspective. The banks' asset qualities 
have significantly improved relative to the non-bank financial 
institutions', and with the money flowing into the banks, the 
systemic dependence upon the banks has become even greater. 
Even the proportion of the deposits taken by the banks is 
continuing to grow at  a faster rate relative to the non-bank 
financial institutions.' 
In fact, if bank loans, corporate bond issues, and total market 
value of the stock market in Korea are classified for the purposes 
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of comparing the direct financing market against the indirect, it is 
evident -that dependency upon the bank loans has corisistently 
grown since the crisis. The relative weight of the total market value 
hovering a t  18 percent implicates that both the quantitative arid 
qualitative growths of the stock market are limited. Furthermore, 
the reduced weight of the corporate bond market attributes to the 
decreased facilities investment by corporates and their polarization. 
Consequently, the weight of the direct financing market has 
reduced and, in turn, that of the banks has increased. 
Given that Korea's industrial structures are device oriented, the 
financial system needs to be developed with the focus upon capital 
markets rather than the banks. Korean businesses in the past may 
be said to have relied upon the: banks for long term investment 
financing, thereby causing increased maturity mismatches arid 
systemic risks as  a result. To resolve these problems, increasing 
the weight of corporate financing through the direct financing 
market would be desirable, a s  it is converltional in other advanced 
economies. 
For the more stable corporate funding and capital markets, Korea 
needs to further develop its marlcet for long-term corporate bonds. 
Shallow corporate bond market urould mean structural  weakness^:^ 
of the market. Unlike Korea. in other such advanced economies ;as 
the United States, the stock and bond markets mutually comple- 
ment each other. Thus, Korea has not efficiently consumed shocks, 
such a s  credit events, that may arise domestic and abroad, thereby 
resulting in the capital pushed toward a single direction and the 
scale of variance in the pricing of all types of financial assets 
significantly increased. 
Although long term investors and short-term traders should 
coexist, financial businesses suoh a s  securities companies arid 
investment trust companies have been sensitive towards short-term 
capital gains. National pension is probably a single best example of 
the long term bond investor; however, it is  Likely that the base for 
the demand of corporate bonds will grow, if the weight of the 
pensions and insurance will be greater within the market for long 
term investment. In addition, successful introduction of derivative 
products would help resolve maturity mismatches and manage 
interest rate variances, among other risks. 
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V. Conclusion: Future Tasks 
Despite marked changes in the financial industry and markets, 
much work still remains to be done for Korea's financial industry 
to be globally competitive. Before o-thers, continued efforts must be 
made on the issues that remain in spite of the restructuring 
initiatives undertaken to date. Efforts need to be made in respect of 
mutual savings banks and credit. cooperatives, while corrective 
actions r n ~ ~ s t  be taken on structural prot~lems such as  excessive 
debts carried by households and ShIEs. 
In order for the financial businesses to enhance their competi- 
tiveness, sound competition structures need to be in place, while 
deregulating mechanisms that prevent proper exercise of the 
financial market's dynamics. Policy makers should work on 
implementing more effective and streamlined regulations so a s  to 
eliminate obstacles that may dampen market dynamics while fully 
supporting sound competition among financial institutions. Fur- 
thermore, i:ncentives deducible from the supervisory framework need 
to be reformed to help continue t.he financial businesses' restruc- 
turing efforts a t  the operational level, such as  risk management 
and corporate governance improvemcirnts. 
Capital markets must also be further vitalized and their 
infrastructures be enhanced to introduce market centric virtuous 
patterns of cashflows. To improve the market participants' confi- 
dence, systemic reforms on corporate accounting must continue, 
while enhancing disclosure systems to ensure that information is 
timely and sufficiently delivered to the investors. Meanwhile, other 
systemic irnprovements are needed to provide a basis for the 
institutional investors' growth on a qualitative and quantitative 
basis. 
Another i.mportant task is to detect and preempt potential risks 
that can arise from ever-changing market environments. Continuous 
monitoring and early warning system make it possible to detect 
problems earlier and take measures in advance, thereby reducing 
contagion and restructuring costs. It. is imperative that a risk-based 
supervision focusing upon the financial businesses' risk manage- 
ment capability is in place. Developments are also necessary to 
improve methods and procedures of the supervision and exam- 
ination, thereby creating market friendly customs and practices. In 
addition, preparations are required in order to successfully meet 
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challenges of the new BIS agreements and their compliance within 
the next couple of years based upon collaborations by and among 
the regulators and financial businesses. 
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